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Abstract: In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive
advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but
it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models.
In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier
supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the
non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue
sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering
supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the
Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain
and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain
profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.
Keywords: innovation investment; pricing; joint decisions; Nash bargaining; customer value
1. Introduction
Consumers’ purchase behavior is becoming increasingly rational. Rational consumers
usually make their purchase decisions based on the value perception of the products. There
are many factors that affect customer value, but the product price and value-added services
at the retail end are two of the key factors [1–3]. In terms of product pricing, customer value
has become one of the important factors that influences a customer’s product choices [4].
Therefore, the price factor cannot be considered as the only pricing decision-making
reference anymore. This paper is motivated by the emergence of innovative business
models in the retail industry. Common retailers (e.g., Target and Walmart) must create
a unique customer experience and competitive pricing strategy to compete with their
competitors, since they sell similar or substitution goods along with their competitors. For
example, the American retailer Target Corporation provides the Circle app for customers to
access coupons in order to be different from its competitors, such as Walmart. Fresh Hema,
a fresh food retailer in China, offers online order pickup and a free 30 min delivery service
within a 3 km radius. As those retailers adopt unique business models, unique channels,
new technology and value-added services, the capital investment decision has become
essential. New technologies and value-added services, which bring improved efficiency of
product delivery and the quality and freshness of the product, can enhance the consumer’s
perceived value of the product. In return, the retailers can be confident to set a higher profit
margin. For example, Fresh Hema has higher margins compared with traditional grocery
stores in China [5]. In fact, the technology connecting consumers and value-added services
based on innovation investment has become the support for enterprises to form competitive
advantages [1]. It is also a powerful guarantee for enterprises to win at product competition
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and increase their market shares. Therefore, investing in value-added services and making
optimal innovation investments have become some of a retailer’s key decisions.
Although the new business model and the corresponding value-added services pro-
vide some retailers with the chance for higher margins, the retail price decision is still
critical, as consumers are sensitive to the product retail price. On the one hand, the product
retail price is the basis for retailers to obtain income. The retail price decision will not only
have an impact on the retailer itself, but also on the upstream enterprises of the supply
chain. In addition, the contract (e.g., revenue sharing contracts) between the retailer and its
supplier also affects the retail price and whether the supply chain members can cooperate.
In order to cope with market competition and improve customer value, it is necessary
to cooperate closely with upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain [4].
Rational consumers will decide whether to buy the product based on the comparison with
the retained value of the product. Obviously, a high retail price will certainly restrain the
market demand. Therefore, focusing on customer value and pricing products scientifically
have become key challenges of supply chain operation. Although innovation investment
can enhance retailers’ competitive advantages and stimulate the potential demand for
products, innovation investment will inevitably increase the retailer’s cost. Therefore,
finding a way to motivate the retailer to make a reasonable innovation investment also
constitutes another challenge in supply chain operation.
In this paper, we investigate the revenue sharing contract design for the retailer and
its supplier, as well as the retailer’s innovation investment decision based on customer
value. We define innovation investment as a concept that aggregates any capital investment
for developing new business models, new channels, new technology and value-added
services. Although revenue sharing contracts have been adopted by multiple industries
and investigated by the existing supply chain management literature, how to determine the
contract parameters, considering innovation investment and customer value, has not been
fully studied. We first construct a demand function that reflects customer value. Based
on the demand function, we develop an optimization model that incorporates multiple
decisions, including revenue shares, the product wholesale price, product retail price,
and innovation investment. We adopt the cooperative Nash bargaining framework to
investigate the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions, based on supply chain
members’ bargaining power. Nash bargaining was first proposed in [6] for the scenario
in which two parties choose alternatives from the same feasible alternative set. They can
agree on one alternative or end up at a disagreement point. The Nash bargaining approach
has been widely used in solving two-party supply chain decision-making problems [7,8].
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first in the supply chain literature that
investigates the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a Nash bargaining
supply chain based on customer value. It is also the first that analyzes the impact of
supply chain game structure, including the bargaining power, on joint decisions. Our
analyses yielded several key findings. When the wholesale price is high or (at the same
time) the retailer’s revenue share is small, the retailer will utilize uncooperative behavior
(i.e., retaliation behavior) in making its decisions, such as a high product retail price. When
the retailer and the supplier play a non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the
supplier Stackelberg game. However, the supply chain cannot be coordinated by revenue
sharing contracts. In the Nash bargaining model, there exists a unique equilibrium for the
Nash bargaining product, and revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain.
The Nash bargaining product can split the supply chain profit, continuously based on the
bargaining power, and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. In addition, the unique Nash
bargaining equilibrium and the bargaining power have a direct matching relationship.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
on consumer value and Nash bargaining, as well as joint innovation investment and pricing
decisions. Section 3 presents the demand function with consumer value, cost structure,
and the assumption. Section 4 analyzes a centralized supply chain model, which is as a
benchmark. In Section 5, we provide the decentralized supply chain models for both the
Sustainability 2021, 13, 1309 3 of 14
non-cooperative game and the Nash bargaining game. We also analyze the properties of
the optimal solutions. Section 6 discusses the managerial insights. Section 7 concludes the
study. Proofs are provided in the Appendix A.
2. Literature Review
This paper investigates the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a
supply chain with customer value and revenue sharing contracts. Thus, the literature
review section includes three main research streams: customer value; joint innovation
investment and pricing decisions; and revenue sharing contracts.
The research on customer value is mainly focused on two dimensions: one is the
creation of customer value, and the other is the influence of customer value on supply
chain operation. For the creation of customer value, since customer value has become the
source of competitive advantage for enterprises [1], one of the focuses of scholars is how
to improve customer value. In terms of the key entry point of customer value creation,
it was found in [9] that the promotion and management of customer value perception is
the key to successfully creating lasting customer value. It was revealed in Ref [10] that
relationship integration and marketing innovation contribute to the creation of customer
value and the promotion of competitiveness. At a more specific level, it was shown in
Ref [2] that customer-perceived control has an important positive impact on customer
value, collaborative creation and service recovery evaluation. Meanwhile, it was proven
in Ref [3] that service innovation and customer satisfaction are two key dimensions of
customer value creation. However, these studies rarely involve supply chain cooperation.
For the second dimension, Luo et al. Ref [4] investigated the impact of customer value
and the power structure on product selection and pricing decisions in a retail supply
chain. The characteristics and functions of customer value creation in supply and demand
management were revealed in Ref [11]. Although these literature focus on the supply
chain decisions with customer value, there are few cooperation and incentive mechanisms
designed around customer value and bargaining power. Moreover, different from the
research above, in this paper, customer value is determined by two factors: price and
innovation investment.
Some of the literature focused on innovation investment and pricing decisions. In
terms of cooperative innovation, it was proven in Ref [12] that strategic commitment to a
price can stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain. Recently, Nouri et al. Ref [13]
investigated the coordination of a manufacturer’s innovation and a retailer’s promotion,
as well as replenishment in a manufacturer–retailer chain with a compensation-based
wholesale price contract. The optimal cooperative innovation decision with uncertain
technology efficiency was investigated in Ref [14], and the impacts of knowledge spillovers
and cartelization on cooperative innovation decisions were analyzed. In terms of joint
innovation investment and production decisions, the joint product innovation and pro-
duction decisions under quality authorization were studied in Ref [15]. This showed
that the firm could jump in its optimal production and investment levels over time. In
terms of joint investment and pricing decisions, three different decision-making structures
were discussed in Ref [16], as well as the impact of product pricing and the timing of
an investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition. An optimal control model about
dynamic pricing and product and process innovation developed in Ref [17] showed that
the pricing rules depended on the sole price optimality condition. Recently, the price
match guarantees and investment incentives by a standard Hotelling-type model were
investigated in Ref [18]. Yang et al. Ref [19] theoretically analyzed the optimal decisions
on product pricing and green technology investment, and they revealed the influence
of different initial allowance allocation rules on product pricing and the choice in green
technology, as well as total emissions. Different from the research above, in this paper,
the price and innovation investment affect customer value, and customer value affects the
market demand.
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Revenue sharing contracts were initially used in the video cassette rental industry and
gained great success [20]. Now, revenue sharing contracts are widely applied in real supply
chain practice [4]. A comprehensive review for revenue sharing contracts was provided in
Ref [21], and the most recent review was conducted in [22]. The strengths and limitations
of revenue sharing contracts in coordinating a supply chain were introduced in Ref [20].
In terms of performance improvement of the supply chain members, it was proven in
Ref [23] that revenue sharing contracts could improve members’ profit. The joint impact
of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on supply chain members were evaluated in
Ref [24]. It was shown in Ref [25,26] that a revenue-sharing contract could improve channel
performance in a green supply chain. The effect of decision rights allocation on channel
performance under a revenue-sharing contract was investigated in Ref [27]. In terms of
supply chain cooperation, the coordination of a supply chain with competing retailers was
investigated in Ref [28]. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing contracts in a
two-period newsvendor problem was studied in Ref [29]. The impact of revenue sharing on
supply chain coordination under a product substitution scenario was studied in Ref [30,31].
In summary, previous works in the literature summarized in this section have not
addressed the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in the context of customer
value or consider cooperative bargaining, which has motivated the study in this paper.
This paper is different from the reviewed literature in several ways. First, in this paper, we
optimize the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions by considering the effect of
customer value on the market demand, which has not been investigated by the literature.
Second, we investigate both non-cooperative games and cooperative Nash bargaining
games. Third, we obtain the equilibrium condition and the profit allocation scheme based
on the supply chain members’ bargaining power.
3. Model Description and Assumptions
We considered a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier
produces a single type of product and sells the product to the consumer market through
the retailer based on revenue sharing contracts. In order to create differentiation when
compared with competitors, the retailer makes decisions on innovation investment for
unique business models, distribution channels, and value-added services. In the market,
the consumer decides to purchase the product based on their perception of the product
value, and the perceived product value is closely related to the product price.
For revenue sharing contracts, let w denote the product’s wholesale price per unit and
φ the retailer’s share of revenue generated from each unit of the product sold. The supply
chain structure is described in Figure 1.
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Assuming the retailer’s innovation investment can stimulate the market demand, we 
denote the innovation investment as i  and the market size of the product as ( )a i . For 
the market size of the product, ( )a i , we assume that it is a non-subtractive concave func-
tion of the innovation investment i : 
i . l i t t .
i il ’ i i i i l ,
denote the innovation investment as i and the market size of the product as a(i). For the
market size of the product, a(i), we assume that it is a non-subtractive concave function of







The non-subtractive concave function is a rather weak condition and can capture the
most common functions of the innovation investment. The insights of this paper are valid
for any non-subtractive concave function of the innovation investment.
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For the consumer, we assume they are heterogeneous in the perception of the product
value, and their customer value, v, is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] within the market
size a(i). A similar distribution function of the customer value was commonly used in the
literature (e.g., [4,24,32]). The insights of this paper are valid for this distribution function.
Given the product price p, if v− p ≥ 0—that is, v ∈ [p, 1]—a consumer will buy the product
(see Figure 2). Therefore, the market demand is
D(i, p) = a(i)
∫ 1
p
dv = (1− p)a(i) (2)
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Equation (2) contains both the product price and the innovation investment.
Obviously, based on the assumptions above, the consumer net surplus, denoted as
CNS(i, p), is modeled as follows:
CNS(i, p) = a(i)
∫ 1
p
dv = (1− p)a(i) (3)
ro Equation (3), both dCNS(i,p)di = (1− p)
da(i)
di > 0 (see Equation (1)) and
dCNS(i,p)
dp =
−pa(i) < 0 exist, which show that consumers prefer a higher innovation investment and
lower product price. In this paper, the customer value is related to the market demand, as
shown in Equation (2).
4. The Benchmark: Centralized Supply Chain Model
In this section, we provide a centralized supply chain model as the benchmark case.
In the centralized supply chain, a central planner determines the innovation investment i
and the price p to maximize the expected supply chain profit, denoted by π(i, p).
π(i, p) = (p− c)D(i, p)− i = (p− c)(1− p)a(i)− i (4)




For the optimal solutions to Equation (5), the following theorem is given.
Theorem 1.
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da(i)
di
|i=ic = 2(1− c)
−2 (7)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 1 characterizes the decision properties and the optimal policies. Interestingly,
we can see that, in the centralized supply chain, in order to obtain the highest profit,
there only exists one combination of the optimal product retail price and the innovation
investment. Obviously, an extremely high product retail price will reduce the customer
value, compromise product demand, and then have a negative impact on the profit of the
supply chain. In addition, although the innovation investment can expand the potential
market, d
2a(i)
di2 < 0 shows that too much innovation investment will lead to an uneconomical
investment. Therefore, there is an optimal innovation investment for the supply chain.
Based on Equation (4), when i = ic and p = pc, the optimal expected profit for the




(1− c)2a(ic)− ic (8)
For the simplicity of the exposition, we let ∆ ≡ 12 (1− c)
2a(ic). Equation (8) can be
rewritten as
π(ic, pc) = ∆− ic (9)
In addition, when i = ic and p = pc, from Equation (3), we can obtain the optimal





Given ∆ ≡ 12 (1− c)
2a(ic), Equation (10) can be rewritten as follows:
CNS(ic, pc) = ∆/(1− c) (11)
The optimization results in the benchmark case will provide a comparative basis for
the decision analyses in the decentralized supply chain.
5. Decentralized Supply Chain Model with Revenue Sharing Contracts
5.1. Revenue Sharing Model
Under the revenue sharing contract (w, φ), the supplier makes the wholesale price
decision and determines the revenue share for the retailer (w, φ). The retailer needs to
determine the innovation investment i and product retail price p. The retailer’s profit
function πr(i, p) is as follows:
πr(i, p) = (φp− w)D(i, p)− i = (φp− w)(1− p)a(i)− i (12)
Then, the supplier’s profit function πs(w, φ) is as follows:
πs(w, φ) = [(1− φ)p + w− c]D(i, p) = [(1− φ)p + w− c](1− p)a(i) (13)




Based on the contract parameters (w, φ), πr(i, p) has the properties in Lemma 1.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 1309 7 of 14
Lemma 1.
1. The property of stochastic dominance exists in πr(i, p) with respect to p;
2. In i,πr(i, p) is concave;







= 2(1− w/φ)−2 (16)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 1 shows that the retailer’s decisions are closely related to the wholesale price
and the revenue share. When the wholesale price is high or (at the same time) the revenue
sharing ratio is small, the retailer can only obtain a small profit margin. Then, the retailer
will take the following uncooperative behaviors. One is that the retailer will increase
the product retail price for a higher profit margin. However, a high product retail price
will reduce customer value and then restrain market demand, which in turn has a direct
negative impact on supplier’s revenue. The other is that the high wholesale price and
small revenue share make the retailer more sensitive to innovation investment; that is, da(i)di
becomes larger. When da(i)di is large, in order to reduce the operation cost, the retailer will
choose to reduce the innovation investment. The lack of innovation investment will also
restrain the market demand and have a direct negative impact on the supplier’s revenue.
For the supplier, a high wholesale price is not always in its own interest. The potential
uncooperative behaviors will be the consequence of a high wholesale price or a small
revenue share for the retailer. Therefore, due to the interdependency of the decisions, the
supplier must consider the retailer’s retaliatory behavior when setting the wholesale price
and revenue share.
It is worth noting that, according to Lemma 1, the best response functions for the
retailer’s innovation investment and pricing decisions only depend on the ratio w/φ. This
means that the retailer’s profit πr(i, p) can be expressed as follows:
πr(i, p) = φ(p− w/φ)(1− p)a(i)− i (17)
Clearly, only the ratio w/φ of the revenue sharing contract (w, φ) has a direct impact
on the supply chain profit, Given w/φ, φ can realize the division of the supply chain
profit between the retailer and the supplier. Therefore, this paper assumes w/φ = c in the
revenue sharing contract (w, φ). Then, the retailer and the supplier will make decisions on
φ and w/φ = c.
Based on the assumptions above, this paper will examine non-cooperative games
(Section 5.2) and a Nash bargaining game (Section 5.3) on the joint innovation investment
and pricing decisions, respectively.
5.2. Non-Cooperative Games
In the non-cooperative game, we assumed a vertical competition game between the
supplier and retailer as either a Stackelberg game or a Nash game. Those games are named
as the supplier Stackelberg (SS) game, retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, and vertical Nash
(VN) game, respectively.
The following theorem shows the equilibrium condition for the non-cooperative game
in the decentralized supply chain.
Theorem 2.
1. Equilibrium only exists in the SS game;
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2. The unique equilibrium of the SS game is φSS = ic/∆, wSS = cic/∆, pSS = pc and iSS = ic;
3. The supply chain cannot be coordinated with revenue sharing contracts in a non-cooperative
game.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 2 reveals the equilibrium condition of the supply chain decisions in the
non-cooperative game. We can find two obvious shortcomings in the non-cooperative
game. First, a non-cooperative game cannot coordinate the supply chain with revenue
sharing contracts. Second, in the non-cooperative game, it is impossible to describe the
bargaining power in the supply chain continuously. Although all the game types may
exist in real practice, the supply chain cannot be coordinated. In the next section, we will
investigate the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a Nash bargaining
supply chain.
5.3. Nash Bargaining Game
5.3.1. Model and Equilibrium of the Nash Bargaining Product
Lemma 1 shows that the retailer will make the pricing and innovation investment
decisions based on w/φ = c. In addition, given w/φ = c, φ is the key basis of profit
division in the supply chain. Therefore, in this section, we assume w/φ = c is a constant,
and the supplier and the retailer bargain over φ. We denote the supplier’s bargaining power
by α ∈ [0, 1], which is exogenously given. Thus, 1− α is the retailer’s bargaining power.
We also denote the supplier’s and the retailer’s threat points by fs and fr, respectively.
Then, we express the Nash product for the supplier and the retailer bargaining on φ under
w/φ = c as
Φ = (πs − fs)α(πr − fr)1−α (18)








(πs − fs)α(πr − fr)1−α
}
(19)
where, based on Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, w/φ = c, and based on Equations (15) and (16),
πr and πs are expressed as follows, respectively:
πr = φ(pc − c)(1− pc)a(ic)− ic (20)
πs = (1− φ)(pc − c)(1− pc)a(ic) (21)




πr = φ∆− ic (22)
πs = (1− φ)∆ (23)
For the simplicity of the exposition, we assume fs = fr = 0, which means the firms
never reach an agreement if one’s profit is zero. Then, the Nash bargaining product from











The Nash bargaining product has the following properties, as shown in Theorems 3
and 4.
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Theorem 3. The Nash bargaining product expressed in Equation (24) is equivalent to an RS game
at α = 0 and equivalent to an SS game at α = 1.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. 
Theorem 3 reveals that the Nash bargaining product in Equation (24) degenerates into
equilibriums of the Stackelberg games under the condition of extreme monopoly power.
Theorem 4. When α ∈ (0, 1), the following are true:
1. The unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product is as follows:
φd = 1− α(1− ic/∆) (25)
2. The supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal expected profits are πr = (1− α)(∆− ic) and
πs = α(∆− ic), respectively;
3. The Nash bargaining product can coordinate the supply chain with revenue sharing contracts.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
From Theorem 4, we can see that the Nash bargaining model has the following three
advantages. First, the model has a unique optimal solution, which shows that the contract
designed in this paper presents enforceability. Second, the designed contract can achieve
supply chain coordination and help enhance the competitiveness of the entire supply chain.
Third, the designed contract includes the supply chain members’ bargaining power, which
improves the stability of the equilibrium achieved by the cooperation.
The above analysis shows that, in the Nash bargaining supply chain with revenue
sharing contracts, the optimal contract parameters, denoted as wd and φd, are φd = 1−
α(1− ic/∆) and wd = φdc. In addition, the optimal innovation investment, denoted as id,
and the optimal price, denoted as pd, are id = ic and pd = pc = 1+c2 . Here, ic is decided by
da(i)
di |i=ic = 2(1− c)
−2.
5.3.2. Impact of Bargaining Power
In this section, we will discuss the impact of the bargaining power on the profit of the
supply chain members, the game equilibrium strategies and consumer surplus.
Corollary 1. Based on the bargaining power, the unique Nash bargaining equilibrium can realize
continuous division of the supply chain profit.
Figure 3 illustrates Corollary 1. Two interesting aspects can be found. One is that, in the
Nash bargaining product, the equilibrium includes the continuous characterization of supply chain
members’ bargaining power. Obviously, this is different from the three discrete game structures in
non-cooperative games: retailer- or supplier-dominated and the Nash game. The other is that this
proposed Nash bargaining product can realize profit distribution based on supply chain members’
bargaining power. The member with the stronger bargaining power will obtain a higher profit.
When the bargaining powers are close, two supply chain members will share the additional profits
from supply chain cooperation. This provides guidance for profit allocation. Moreover, supply chain
coordination is possible under certain conditions.
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Corollary 3. The proposed Nash bargaining product can inte rate the bargaining power, the
optimal profit of the supply chain and the maximum consumer net surpl s simultaneously.
Figure 5 provides an illustration for orollary 3. Interestingly, from orollary 3, we find that
the equilibrium in the proposed Nash bargaining product can achieve the consumer net surplus and
the supply chain profit in the decentralized case as it does in the centralized case. An interesting
observation from Figure 5 is that the equilibrium outcomes, including the optimal consumer net
surplus and the optimal supply chain profit, are not affected by the bargaining power. This also
shows the advantage of the proposed Nash bargaining product from another perspective.
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5.4. ash Bargaining vs. on-Cooperative Ga e
This section will co pare the supply chain profits and consu er net surplus under
different game types. Two significant findings can be observed in Table 1. First, for the
decentralized supply chain, the non-cooperative game cannot achieve a feasible cooperation
scheme, and supply chain cooperation is invalid (where the supplier monopolizes the profit
of supply chain cooperation). Second, in the Nash bargaining game, the proposed Nash
bargaining product can achieve a feasible cooperation scheme, and the equilibrium can
achieve the coordination of the decentralized supply chain. In this case, not only do
the supplier and the retailer share the profit from the supply chain cooperation, but the
consumer net surplus is optimal.
Table 1. Profit and surplus.
Expected Profit
Consumer Net Surplus
Retailer Supplier Supply Chain
Non-cooperative game
VN 0 0 0 0
RS 0 0 0 0
SS 0 ∆− ic ∆− ic ∆/(1− c)
Nash bargaining (1− α)(∆− ic) α(∆− ic) ∆− ic ∆/(1− c)
Centralized model - - ∆− ic ∆/(1− c)
6. Discussions
In this section, we discuss the managerial insights obtained from the analytical and
numerical results. For the centralized supply chain, there only exists one combination
of the optimal product retail price and the innovation investment. An extremely high
product retail price will reduce th customer v lue, compromise pr duct demand and
have a negative impact on the profit of the supply chain. This mea s that th supply chain
should never seek a high retail price. As Lemma 1 indicates, it is optimal for the supplier
to seize an extremely large portion of the supply chain profit by using its supply chain
position. The retailer would not cooperate with the supplier by setting a high retail price,
which reduces the market demand and revenue for the supplier. In addition, Theorem
2 demonstrates that the supply chain cannot be coordinated in a supplier Stackelberg
game. Therefore, the supplier needs to make its decisions wisely to make sure its own
profit is maximized. Different from the Stackelberg game, the Nash bargaining model
can help achieve supply chain coordination in revenue sharing contracts. This means
that in real practice, there exists the possibility that both the supplier and the retailer
can improve their profits. In addition, the supply chain decisions can be made based on
supply chain players’ bargaining powers. This improves the stability of the equilibrium
achieved by cooperation. In addition, the consumer net surplus is also optimal in the Nash
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bargaining game. Therefore, those results can be used in real practice to assist supply chain
decision-making.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, from the perspective of customer value, we used the cooperative bar-
gaining framework to investigate joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in
a supply chain with revenue sharing contracts. We first developed a centralized supply
chain model and showed that the model had a unique equilibrium solution. Second, we
investigated the non-cooperative game and found that when the wholesale price was high
or (at the same time) the revenue share was small for the retailer, the retailer would take
retaliatory behavior, such as setting a high product retail price. In addition, equilibrium
only existed in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, the supply chain could not be
coordinated by revenue sharing contracts. Third, in the Nash bargaining model, we found
that there existed a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product, and revenue
sharing contracts could coordinate the supply chain. The Nash bargaining product could
split the supply chain profit based on the bargaining power continuously. In addition, the
unique Nash bargaining equilibrium and the bargaining power had a direct matching rela-
tionship. In the equilibrium, the net surplus of consumers was not affected by the supply
chain members’ bargaining power. This paper is the first in the supply chain literature that
investigates the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a Nash bargaining
supply chain based on customer value. The existing literature, such as that by Kim and
Ahmed [18] and Yang et al. [19], did not focus on the impact of the supply chain game
structure on the coordination outcomes. In addition, this paper is also the first to analyze
the impact of the supply chain game structure, including the bargaining power, on the joint
decisions.
Further research may consider additional real-world factors, such as market competi-
tion. This is because competitors’ pricing strategies and business models also affect the
market demand and the retailer’s decisions. In addition, other contracts can be considered,
and comparative analyses can be conducted to show which contract type is favorable to
each supply chain member. In addition, the proposed models and theorems are planned
to be tested via real retail supply chains, and parameter values will be obtained after
consultancy with practicing managers.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1.
1. From Equation (4), we get dπ(i,p)dp = (1 + c− 2p)a(i) and
d2π(i,p)
dp2 = −2a(i). This is the
property of stochastic dominance, which exists in π(i, p) with respect to p. Therefore,
by letting dπ(i,p)dp = 0, we get pc =
1+c
2 ;
2. When pc = 1+c2 , from Equation (4), we get
dπ(i,p)
di = (p− c)(1− p)
da(i)
di − 1 and
d2π(i,p)
di2 = (p− c)(1− p)
d2a(i)
di2 . By combining this with
d2a(i)
di2 , we get
d2π(i,p)
di2 < 0.
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Therefore, π(i, p) is concave in i. By letting dπ(i,p)di = 0, we get
da(i)
di |i=ic = 2(1− c)
−2.

Proof of Theorem 2.
1. Since the property of stochastic dominance exists in πs(w, φ) with respect to w and φ,
the supplier will let w = 1 and φ = 0. These mean there are no equilibrium solutions
in the VN game or the RS game;
2. In the SS game, Lemma 1 shows that Equations (15) and (16) are the retailer’s best
response functions. The supplier will get the maximum profit of the whole supply
chain by φ = ic/∆, w = cic/∆. Therefore, the equilibrium of the SS game is φSS =
ic/∆, wSS = cic/∆, pSS = pc and iSS = ic;
3. Statement 1 of Theorem 2 shows that there are no RS games or a VN games in the
non-cooperative game between the supplier and retailer. In addition, in the SS game,
the retailer can only get zero profit. That means the cooperation is invalid in the
supply chain under a non-cooperative game. Therefore, the supply chain cannot be
coordinated with the revenue sharing contracts in a non-cooperative game. 
Proof of Theorem 4.


















< 0. By combining α ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ (0, 1) and
φ > ic/∆, we get d
2Φ
dφ2 < 0. Therefore, Φ is concave in φ. By letting
dΦ
dφ = 0, we get
φd = 1− α(1− ic/∆);
2. When φ = φd, from Equations (22) and (23), we get πr = (1− α)(∆− ic) and πs =
α(∆− ic), respectively;
3. In this proposed Nash bargaining product, w/φ = c is present. When w/φ = c, from
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, we know the decentralized supply chain will choose the
same pricing and innovation investment as the centralized supply chain. In addition,
the second statement of Theorem 4 shows that πr > 0 and πs > 0. As such, the
proposed Nash bargaining product can coordinate the supply chain with the revenue
sharing contracts. 
Proof of Lemma 1. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 
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